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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Although mandatory partner rotation has existed in the U.S. in some form since 
the 1970s, insufficient U.S. partner-specific data has limited researchers’ ability to 
examine the costs and benefits of mandatory U.S. partner rotation in the current audit 
environment. Using proprietary data from a large international audit firm, I investigate 
the effect of mandatory lead partner rotation in the U.S. on three proxies for audit 
quality: audit fees, identifying and reporting a material control weakness, and providing 
a modified audit opinion. 
Controlling for client- and audit-specific characteristics, I provide evidence that 
mandatory rotation of the lead engagement partner increases audit quality in the year of 
rotation among larger audit offices only; audit quality is lower in the year of mandatory 
lead partner rotation in smaller offices. Further, rotation increases audit quality when the 
incoming lead engagement partner has the requisite industry expertise, but decreases 
audit quality when the lead partner lacks such expertise. Additional analyses show that 
mandatory concurring partner rotation has a similar, albeit weaker effect on audit 
quality. My results are robust to various proxies for audit quality, time periods, and 
model specifications. These findings provide evidence on the costs and benefits of 
partner rotation and informs practitioners, academics, and regulators as to the 
consequences of mandatory partner rotation in the U.S. 
 
iii 
DEDICATION 
 
 
To my wonderful wife, Marcie, and our four children, Spencer, Gavin, Tyler, and 
Emma. With the help of the former I can accomplish anything; with the help of the latter 
it’s a miracle anything gets accomplished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I thank the participating audit firm for providing me with data on partner 
rotation. I am also very grateful for the support and guidance of my dissertation 
committee: Marjorie Shelley (Chair), Dechun Wang (Co-Chair), Tom Omer, Steve 
Glover, and Steve Courtright. I am also grateful for helpful comments and suggestions 
from Dane Christensen, Brian Daugherty, Jere Francis, James Hansen, Keith Jones, Bree 
Josefy, John Keyser, Phil Lamoreaux, Elaine Mauldin, Andrew McMartin, Stevie 
Neuman, Nate Newton, Adam Olson, Adrienne Rhodes, Nate Sharp, and workshop 
participants at Texas A&M University, the University of Missouri, and the 2014 BYU 
Accounting Symposium. I acknowledge the generous financial support from the Deloitte 
Foundation and the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
ABSTRACT  ...................................................................................................................... ii 
DEDICATION  ................................................................................................................. iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  ............................................................................................. iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  .................................................................................................. v 
1. INTRODUCTION  ......................................................................................................... 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  ............................ 7 
2.1 Regulatory Background  ................................................................................... 7 
2.2 Mandatory Rotation and Audit Quality  ........................................................... 7 
2.3 Partner Rotation and Office Size  ................................................................... 11  
 
3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY  ........................................................................... 14 
3.1 Sample Selection  ........................................................................................... 14 
3.2 Audit Quality  ................................................................................................. 16 
3.2.1 Proxy for Audit Quality: Audit Fees  .............................................. 16 
3.2.2 Proxy for Audit Quality: Material Control Weakness Disclosures  18 
3.2.3 Proxy for Audit Quality: Modified Audit Opinion  ........................ 20 
3.3 Tests of Hypotheses  ...................................................................................... 22 
 
4. RESULTS  .................................................................................................................... 23 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  ..................................................................................... 23 
4.2 Multivariate Results  ...................................................................................... 24 
4.2.1 Audit Fees  ...................................................................................... 24 
4.2.2 Material Weaknesses  ...................................................................... 26 
4.2.3 Modified Audit Opinion  ................................................................. 27 
4.2.4 Partner Industry Expertise  .............................................................. 28 
 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES  ...................................................................................... 31 
5.1 Comparison to the Prior Year  ........................................................................ 31 
5.2 Material Misstatements as Proxy for Audit Quality  ...................................... 31 
vi 
 Page 
 
5.3 Concurring Partner Rotation and Audit Quality  ........................................... 33 
5.4 Lead Partner Serving as Concurring Partner for another Client  ................... 34 
5.5 Different Rotation Regimes  .......................................................................... 35 
5.6 Requiring a Mandatory Rotation Event for Sample Inclusion  ...................... 35 
 
6. CONCLUSION  ........................................................................................................... 37 
REFERENCES  ................................................................................................................ 40 
APPENDIX A VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  .................................................................. 46 
APPENDIX B TABLES  ................................................................................................. 49 
 
  
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
To preserve auditor independence, auditing standards have, since the 1970s, 
required U.S. audit partners to regularly rotate audit clients (AICPA 1978; U.S. House of 
Representatives Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002). However, because of limited access to 
partner-level data, prior research has been limited in its ability to address mandatory 
partner rotation’s effectiveness and its overall effect is still unclear (DeFond and Zhang 
2014).1 In response to a call for additional research on the specific costs and benefits of 
mandatory partner rotation (Bamber and Bamber 2009), I use a large audit firm’s 
proprietary database on partner rotations to investigate the overall effects of mandatory 
U.S. partner rotation on audit quality, as well as cross-sectional settings in which these 
effects may be more or less pronounced. 
The purpose of mandatory partner rotation is to preserve auditors’ independence 
by 1) ensuring that audit partners do not become overly familiar with the client as the 
tenure of the partner-client relationship increases, and 2) providing a “fresh look” at 
client risks (Bamber and Iyer 2007; SEC 2003). Using rotation to preserve auditor 
independence, however, comes at the cost of client-specific knowledge, which is 
important for effectively employing a risk-based audit strategy. In a recent survey, both 
investors and audit partners indicate that the knowledge, experience, and training of 
engagement team members are among the most important determinants of audit quality 
(Christensen, Glover, Omer, and Shelley 2015). This knowledge and expertise is most 
                                                          
1 Prior studies investigating mandatory partner rotation use limited U.S. data from before Sarbanes-Oxley 
(Bedard and Johnstone 2010), estimate when U.S. rotation events occur (Litt, Sharma, Simpson, and Tanyi 
2014), or use international data (Chi, Huang, Liao, and Xie 2009; Lennox, Wu, and Zhang 2014). 
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important at the lead and concurring partner level, because those individuals ultimately 
make the decision on the audit opinion.2 Therefore, while requiring partner rotation may 
improve audit quality by avoiding reductions in independence, rotation may also reduce 
audit quality through the loss of client-specific knowledge developed by the partner. As 
such, the net effects of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality are unclear. 
In addition to the general effects of rotation, and to add cross-sectional evidence 
to prior literature (e.g., Lennox et al. 2014), I examine whether the effect of mandatory 
partner rotation on audit quality depends on audit office size. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) acknowledged that it might be more difficult for smaller 
audit firms with fewer partners and clients to effectively comply with mandatory rotation 
requirements (SEC 2003). While the SEC’s concerns related to smaller audit firms, small 
offices within larger audit firms may face similar constraints in complying with rotation 
requirements. A recent survey of audit partners by Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield, and 
Higgs (2012) further suggests that the negative effects of partner rotation may be 
exacerbated in small audit offices. Alternatively, Francis and Yu (2009) indicate that 
larger audit offices perform higher quality audits, which they attribute to more in-house 
experience. This experience, along with more resources, may allow large audit offices to 
withstand the loss of partners’ client-specific knowledge upon mandatory rotation. 
Therefore, large offices’ collective experience and resources potentially result in a net 
positive effect from partner rotation. Alternatively, small audit offices may not be able to 
                                                          
2 Concurring partners (also known as engagement quality review partners) review the audit and provide a 
concurring opinion of report issuance (PCAOB 2009). For parsimony, I refer to them throughout the text 
as concurring partners. 
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readily replace the client-specific knowledge of the departing partners, thus increasing 
the costs of rotation in small audit offices such that the costs outweigh any benefits 
associated with preserving independence and allowing a fresh perspective. 
I evaluate mandatory partner rotation’s effect on three proxies for audit quality. 
First, I examine mandatory rotation’s effect on audit fees. While higher audit fees do not 
automatically result in higher audit quality, they are typically associated with more 
auditor effort, and thus higher quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Therefore, holding 
client risk constant and capitalizing on the exogenous nature of mandatory partner 
rotation, higher (lower) audit fees in the year of rotation indicate higher (lower) audit 
quality. Second, I examine the likelihood of the audit firm reporting a material control 
weakness in its opinion on the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls. The 
majority of control weaknesses are identified through auditors’ tests of controls (Bedard 
and Graham 2011); therefore, a higher (lower) likelihood of identifying and reporting a 
material weakness indicates higher (lower) audit quality (DeFond and Lennox 2015). 
Finally, I examine auditor reporting conservatism in the year of mandatory lead partner 
rotation as measured by the likelihood of issuing a modified audit opinion. The audit 
opinion is the final product of the audit and prior literature has used an auditor’s 
propensity to issue a modified audit opinion as a measure of conservatism (e.g., Francis 
and Krishnan 1999). As such, all else constant, a higher (lower) likelihood of issuing a 
modified audit report indicates higher (lower) audit quality. 
Using data from a large international audit firm’s U.S. public client portfolio 
from 2000-2012, and across all three audit quality proxies, I find no evidence that 
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mandatory rotation of the lead partner has a significant effect on the quality of audits 
generally. However, consistent with concerns voiced by SEC while formulating current 
partner rotation rules, I find that mandatory lead partner rotation has a positive effect on 
audit quality in large offices, but a negative effect in smaller offices. Specifically, in the 
year of mandatory lead partner rotation in larger offices I find evidence of higher audit 
fees, a higher likelihood of identifying and reporting a material weakness, and a higher 
likelihood of providing a modified audit opinion. Alternatively, auditors in small offices 
are less likely to identify and report material weaknesses in the year of lead partner 
rotation. This combination of results suggests that while mandatory lead partner rotation 
increases audit quality in large audit offices, it reduces audit quality for small audit 
offices.  
As an additional cross-sectional test, I examine whether the lead engagement 
partner’s industry expertise moderates the effect of mandatory rotation on audit quality. 
A significant cost of mandatory partner rotation is the loss of the outgoing partner’s 
client-specific knowledge; however, this loss may be tempered if the incoming partner 
has other clients in the same industry. In this case, the benefits of a fresh look may 
outweigh any loss of client-specific knowledge. Consistent with this notion, I find that 
mandatory lead partner rotation significantly increases audit quality when the incoming 
lead partner has expertise in the new client’s industry. Alternatively, if the partner lacks 
industry expertise, audit quality is significantly lower in the year of mandatory lead 
partner rotation. Finally, I examine the effect of concurring partner rotation on audit 
quality and find evidence of lower audit fees in small audit offices and a higher 
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likelihood of reporting a material weakness in the year of mandatory concurring partner 
rotation in large audit offices. Therefore, similar to the effect of mandatory lead partner 
rotation, the effect of mandatory concurring partner rotation is moderated by office size.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides direct 
evidence, using actual audit firm data, on the effect of mandatory partner rotation on 
audit quality using a large sample of publicly-traded U.S. companies. Whereas previous 
studies are limited to a few years of data before the current rotation requirements were in 
place (e.g., Bedard and Johnstone 2010), are forced to assume when mandatory rotation 
occurs (Litt et al. 2014), or examine international settings (e.g., Lennox et al. 2014), I am 
able to examine actual rotation data from 2000-2012 for U.S. companies.  
Second and more importantly, my findings indicate that the effect of mandatory 
partner rotation on audit quality is not the same for all audit clients. While I present 
evidence of increased audit quality in the year of mandatory partner rotation in large 
offices, small offices appear to struggle to cope with mandatory rotation requirements. In 
setting mandatory rotation guidelines, the SEC acknowledged concerns about the ability 
of smaller audit firms to implement mandatory partner rotation. My results suggest that 
similar concerns exist for small offices within large audit firms, consistent with the 
survey results of Daugherty et al. (2012). Further, I find that the lead partner’s industry 
expertise appears to moderate the effect of reduced client-specific knowledge, but when 
industry expertise is not present, audit quality is reduced. These cross-sectional findings 
directly respond to Bamber and Bamber’s (2009) request for evidence of the specific 
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costs and benefits of mandatory partner rotation and provide insights for audit firms to 
consider when rotating partners.  
Third, given the PCAOB’s renewed proposal to require the disclosure of audit 
partner names in the audit report (PCAOB 2013) or as potential audit quality indicators 
(PCAOB 2014), this study provides a timely analysis of the impact of U.S. audit partners 
on audit quality. Finally, I provide the first evidence on the effect of concurring partner 
rotation in the U.S. These findings inform practitioners, academics, and regulators as to 
the consequences of U.S. mandatory partner rotation. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Regulatory Background 
 Periodic, mandatory rotation of key audit partners has traditionally been accepted 
as an acceptable method of enhancing auditor independence. In the 1970s, the AICPA 
required lead engagement partners to rotate clients every seven years (AICPA 1978). 
Similarly, the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA), the ethics 
body of the International Federation of Accountants, mandates key partner rotation at 
least every seven years (IESBA 2013). These standards were deemed insufficient 
following the accounting scandals of the early 2000’s, prompting the U.S. House of 
Representatives to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), mandating that lead 
engagement partners rotate at least every five years (U.S. House of Representatives 
2002). SOX also extended the rotation requirement to concurring review partners, 
partners who serve a quality control role but were not previously subject to rotation 
under AICPA and SEC guidelines. While SOX did not specify the length of the cooling-
off period following partner rotation, the SEC subsequently established that rotating 
partners cannot have any association with the client for five years following rotation 
(SEC 2003).  
2.2 Mandatory Rotation and Audit Quality 
The concepts of audit partner rotation and tenure are necessarily related, and 
several studies have examined U.S. data regarding audit firm tenure to inform the debate 
as to U.S. audit firm rotation (Ghosh and Moon 2005; Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003). 
These studies generally find evidence suggesting that greater client-specific knowledge 
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gained over time produces higher quality audits, suggesting that mandatory audit firm 
rotation would potentially decrease audit quality because of the loss of client-specific 
knowledge. However, audit firm rotation involves competition and changes between 
audit firms resulting in different engagement teams and audit methodologies, whereas 
partner rotation involves only within-firm changes, keeping the engagement team largely 
intact. Therefore, research on audit firm rotation cannot speak directly to the effects of 
mandatory partner rotation. 
Two compelling arguments exist for predicting an association between audit 
quality and audit partner rotation. While some argue that the loss of client knowledge 
upon rotation reduces audit quality, others suggest that a “fresh look” increases the 
independence and objectivity of the audit partner, thus increasing audit quality. I discuss 
these competing arguments and relevant literature below.3 
Partners gain client-specific experience over time that helps them to better 
understand client risks, enabling partners to effectively implement risk-based audit 
strategies in line with professional standards (PCAOB 2010) and maximize the 
likelihood that the engagement team will identify material misstatements and issue the 
correct audit opinion. Recent survey evidence suggests that both partners and investors 
view the experience and competence of the audit engagement team as primary drivers of 
audit quality (Christensen et al. 2015). Further, a number of studies suggest that 
                                                          
3 International literature examining the effects of partner tenure and non-mandatory partner rotation are 
mixed (see Azizkhani 2013; Carey and Simnett 2006; Chen et al. 2008; Chi and Huang 2005; Fargher et 
al. 2008; Stewart et al. 2013) and may not apply in a U.S. setting due to differences in regulatory settings. 
I focus my discussion on U.S. studies that examine partner rotation, as well as two international studies on 
mandatory partner rotation. 
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auditor/firm expertise improves audit quality (Beck and Wu 2006; Bedard 1989; Bonner 
1990; Hammersley 2006; Ittonen, Johnstone, and Myllymaki 2014; Owhoso, Messier, 
and Lynch 2002; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Stephens 2011; Taylor 2000; Wright and 
Wright 1997). Thus, greater understanding of client risks should improve audit quality. 
Management literature suggests that knowledge transfer from one individual to 
another (i.e., the outgoing partner to others) is difficult, particularly when the knowledge 
is context-specific or hard to articulate, such as client risks (Almeida and Kogut 1999; 
Argote and Ingram 2000; Nonaka 1991). Therefore, the client-specific knowledge of the 
partner would be lost following rotation, potentially reducing audit quality by reducing 
the ability of the engagement team to perform a risk-based audit. Litt et al. (2014) make 
some assumptions regarding partner rotation in the U.S. and find lower audit quality in 
the two years after assumed mandatory partner rotation.4 Chi et al. (2009) examine 
mandatory partner rotation in Taiwan and find some evidence of lower audit quality 
following mandatory partner rotation. These studies provide limited evidence that the 
loss of partners’ client-specific knowledge through rotation can impair audit quality. 
Alternatively, regulators have voiced the concern that auditors’ independence 
and objectivity decrease as partner-client tenure increases. One potential outcome is that 
partners may become more willing to acquiesce to client demands as the length of the 
auditor-client relationship increases. Regulators also posit that a new partner may bring a 
                                                          
4 Litt et al. (2014) is subject to the same data limitations as other U.S. studies, namely, they are unable to 
explicitly determine when rotation occurs. Instead, their study makes the assumption that partners rotate 
only when mandated by regulation, not allowing for the possibility of non-mandatory rotation. Table 1, 
Panel B, indicates a non-trivial level of non-mandatory lead partner rotation. As such, due to inherent data 
limitations, it is unclear the extent to which Litt et al. (2014) is able to provide insights into the effects of 
mandatory partner rotation. 
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“fresh look” to the audit, enabling them to identify new risks (SEC 2003). While 
knowledge transfer from one individual to another is difficult, research suggests that 
individuals are rather adept at applying their own past knowledge to new settings (see 
Argote and Ingram 2000). Vermeulen and Barkema (2001, 461) find that companies that 
engage in acquisitions are “exposed to a large variety of events and ideas, which enables 
them to develop richer knowledge structures and decreases the rigidity in their mental 
maps and routines.” Similarly, a new partner brings a different perspective to the audit 
engagement team and thus may help to identify risks overlooked by the prior 
engagement team.  
In an audit setting, Bamber and Iyer (2007) find that auditors are more likely to 
identify with their clients (i.e., see themselves and their interests as similar to those of 
the client) as the tenure of the auditor-client relationship increases. Further, they find that 
those auditors who identify more with their client are less likely to resist aggressive 
accounting positions by management. Tan (1995) finds that auditors who inherit a client 
from another auditor pay more attention to facts inconsistent with prior year decisions 
than auditors who were involved with the prior year audit. As such, mandatory rotation 
could increase audit quality by increasing the independence and objectivity of the lead 
engagement partner and by bringing a fresh perspective to the audit engagement. In 
support of this notion, Lennox et al. (2014) examine Chinese data and report higher audit 
quality in both the year before and the year of mandatory rotation. Using pre-SOX data 
from one U.S. audit firm, Bedard and Johnstone (2010) demonstrate that planned audit 
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effort increases in the year of partner rotation, indicating a likely increase in audit 
quality.5  
Because evidence exists both for and against mandatory partner rotation, the net 
costs and benefits of audit partner rotation in the U.S. are unclear.6 Further, these studies 
do not explicitly address mandatory U.S. partner rotation in the current environment and 
thus are unable to inform the debate concerning the efficacy of current mandatory 
partner rotation requirements. As such, the net effect of mandatory U.S. partner rotation 
on publicly-traded companies remains an open empirical question. Given the competing 
arguments as to the effect of mandatory rotation on audit quality, I state H1 in the null as 
follows:  
 H1: Mandatory lead partner rotation has no effect on audit quality. 
2.3 Partner Rotation and Office Size 
In establishing the current standard on partner rotation, the SEC acknowledged 
concerns that mandatory partner rotation might have disproportionately higher 
implementation costs for small audit firms (SEC 2003). These concerns were primarily 
based on the logistical difficulty facing small audit firms with fewer partners, and thus 
                                                          
5 Although Bedard and Johnstone (2010) examine planned and not actual audit effort, actual audit effort is 
frequently equal to, if not greater than, planned audit effort (Coram, Ng, and Woodliff 2003).  
 
6 In an unpublished dissertation, Matthews (2012) uses U.S. data from 1990-2010 to examine U.S. partner 
rotation and audit quality. This data was obtained from a few offices as well as through partner signature 
analysis from audit reports. The study finds that audit quality improves in the year of rotation, but only if 
audit quality is unusually low in the year before rotation. In a recent working paper, Laurion, Lawrence, 
and Ryans (2014) use SEC comment letters to identify partner changes. This approach relies on 
observations in which the audit partner was voluntarily copied on the SEC communications and is unable 
to differentiate between mandatory and non-mandatory rotation. My data includes an audit firm’s 
comprehensive listing of partners and client companies that enables me to identify and examine mandatory 
partner rotations. 
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fewer degrees of freedom, to comply with mandatory rotation requirements while still 
assigning partners to clients in an efficient and effective manner. Accordingly, audit 
firms with fewer than five public clients and fewer than ten partners are exempt from 
mandatory partner rotation requirements. While large audit firms clearly do not qualify 
for this exemption, small offices within large audit firms may face similar constraints in 
complying with mandatory rotation requirements. Particularly difficult for these smaller 
offices is the five-year cooling-off period during which small offices have fewer partners 
from whom to choose when a client needs a new partner.  
A recent survey by Daugherty et al. (2012) suggests that the potential negative 
effects of mandatory partner rotation may be exacerbated in small offices. Small offices’ 
inability to easily replace the loss of client-specific knowledge potentially offsets any 
benefits of a fresh look at client risk or increased partner independence. Additionally, 
because of the small number of partners in small audit offices, rotating partners are more 
likely to have some familiarity with the new client from intraoffice interactions, 
potentially reducing the incremental benefits of the fresh look. 
In contrast, large audit offices with more partners and clients likely have fewer 
problems complying with mandatory rotation requirements. Large audit offices are better 
able to compensate for the loss of client-specific knowledge of the rotating partner 
because of a larger quantity of overall knowledge within the office. Using the issuance 
of going concern opinions and the level of discretionary accruals as measures of audit 
quality, Francis and Yu (2009) find that large audit offices perform higher-quality audits. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that large offices have more collective 
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industry and client-specific knowledge, enabling all of its auditors to perform better 
audits. Because this general knowledge can help offset the loss of client-specific 
knowledge of the departing partner, and because the larger number of partners and 
clients lessens the logistical difficulties associated with rotation, mandatory rotation 
would likely be more beneficial in large audit offices.  
Bamber and Bamber (2009, 398) have called for research that explicitly 
examines the costs and benefits of partner rotation to establish “whether and to what 
extent audit partner rotation leads to any measurable benefits at all.” To accomplish this, 
I examine office size, an audit characteristic of concern to regulators in regard to partner 
rotation (SEC 2003) and that has been associated with cross-sectional differences in 
audit quality in the literature (Francis and Yu 2009; Francis, Michas, and Yu 2013). 
Based on the discussion above, I expect that the effect of mandatory partner rotation is 
primarily beneficial to audit quality in large offices, but primarily detrimental to audit 
quality in small offices. I state H2 as follows:  
H2: Office size moderates the effect of mandatory partner rotation on audit 
quality, with a positive effect in large audit offices and a negative effect in small 
audit offices. 
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3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample Selection 
I obtain partner rotation data (both mandatory and non-mandatory) from a large 
accounting firm subject to annual PCAOB inspection.7 Consistent with prior literature 
utilizing an audit firm’s proprietary archival data (e.g., Bedard and Johnstone 2010), I 
cannot provide the exact number of company-year observations in my dataset. However, 
the initial sample is in the thousands of company-year observations. My initial dataset 
includes company-year observations from 1998-2013 for which I require that the audit 
firm in question be the auditor of record for a financial statement audit resulting in a 10-
K filing (e.g., after removing audits of an 11-K Employee Benefit Plan) and have data on 
lead engagement partners. From this initial sample, I remove company-year observations 
that do not merge with Compustat. Because of audit fee disclosures beginning in 2000 
and because of incomplete rotation data in 2013, I also remove observations for fiscal 
years before 2000 or after 2012. Finally, to ensure consistency between data sources, I 
remove observations for which the audit firm identifier in Audit Analytics did not 
correspond to the participating audit firm, resulting in a base sample that numbers in the 
thousands of company-year observations. Additional sample reductions are made based 
on regression-specific data requirements. 
                                                          
7 Partner data is listed by generic partner identification and not by actual partner name. I affirm that the 
original dataset has been seen by members of my dissertation committee, some of whom have also spoken 
to the individual who provided the data. Some manipulation of the original dataset was required (e.g., 
adjusting fiscal years for companies with fiscal year-ends from January through May in order to merge 
with Compustat). Inferences are consistent when these observations are dropped from the sample, 
suggesting that results are not driven by possible errors introduced during the data cleaning process. 
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In the absence of mandatory partner rotation, it is difficult to accurately 
determine the effect of partner rotation on audit quality because of the endogenous 
choice of partners to rotate off of a client. A myriad of factors can influence this choice 
including, but not limited to, difficulty with the client, partner retirement, changes to the 
office-specific portfolio of clients or partners, etc. As such, it is not clear whether 
findings from studies that do not explicitly differentiate between mandatory and non-
mandatory firm or partner rotation can be applied in a mandatory rotation setting (see 
discussion in Chi et al. 2009, 364; Lennox et al. 2014, 1795; Myers et al. 2003, 796). 
Regulator-mandated rotation, however, provides a setting in which the rotation event is 
exogenously determined and thus allows researchers to arrive at unbiased inferences 
regarding the effect of partner rotation on audit outcomes.  
My main analyses focus on lead partner rotation; concurring partner rotation is 
addressed in Section V. I create a dataset that contains all client-year observations in 
which mandatory lead partner rotation occurred as well as all client-year observations in 
which no lead partner rotation occurred. This sample explicitly excludes observations 
with non-mandatory lead partner rotation to ensure that all lead partner rotations are due 
to mandatory rotation, and allows me to examine the average effect of mandatory lead 
partner rotation on audit quality.8 For the analyses of audit fees and modified opinions, I 
include observations from 2000-2012. Material weaknesses were not reported until 
                                                          
8 Inferences are robust to including all observations and controlling for non-mandatory lead partner 
rotation. 
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2004, thus samples used to test the effect of mandatory partner rotation on material 
weakness disclosure include years 2004-2012.  
3.2 Audit Quality 
Audit quality is a multi-faceted construct, suggesting that it may be necessary to 
examine multiple proxies to arrive at meaningful inferences (Christensen et al. 2015; 
DeFond and Zhang 2014; Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, and Velury 2013). In 
this study, I examine the effect of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality using three 
main proxies: audit fees; disclosures of material weaknesses; and modified audit 
opinions. 
3.2.1 Proxy for Audit Quality: Audit Fees 
My first proxy for audit quality is the log of audit fees. While paying higher audit 
fees alone does not guarantee higher audit quality, both auditors and investors generally 
associate the payment of reasonable fees with higher audit quality (Christensen et al. 
2015; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Francis, Reichelt, and Wang 2005). I estimate the 
following regression model consistent with existing audit fee literature (e.g., Charles, 
Glover, and Sharp 2010; Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006): 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐶ℎ𝑔_𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽18𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽19−22𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜇,               (1) 
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where LogAF is the log of total audit fees. Audit fees compensate auditors for effort 
expended over the course of the audit, with higher fees normally equating to higher 
levels of auditor effort (Simunic 1980). MandatoryRotation is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 in years in which the audit firm mandatorily rotated the lead engagement partner 
(i.e., the first year of the new partner), and equal to 0 otherwise. Using regression to hold 
client risk and other engagement characteristics constant, a positive (negative) 
coefficient on MandatoryRotation indicates the payment of higher (lower) audit fees in 
the year of rotation, thus higher (lower) audit quality. 
 In addition to controlling for company size (LogAT), which is the primary 
determinant of audit fees, I also control for potential earnings management by including 
lagged discretionary accruals (DAcc) as measured by the modified Jones model 
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995). I control for company complexity by including 
variables capturing the number of business segments (Segment) and foreign income 
(Foreign), and for financial performance by including return on assets (ROA) and an 
indicator variable indicating a loss in the current or prior two years (Loss). I further 
control for various company specific characteristics shown to require additional audit 
effort and thus audit fees. Specifically, I control for a company’s accounts receivable and 
inventory levels (AR_INV), debt (Leverage), the reporting of special items (Special), and 
growth (MB). It is also important to ensure that results are not driven by other auditor-
related characteristics. Therefore, I control for the presence of a modified audit opinion 
(Modify), logged non-audit fees (LogNAF), the first year of the auditor-client 
relationship (Chg_Aud), the audit firm’s industry expertise (Expert), the size of the audit 
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firm office (OfficeClients), the logged tenure of the audit firm-client relationship 
(LogTenure), and the amount of time required to complete the audit (ReportLag).  
Audit quality in the year of mandatory lead partner rotation may also be affected 
by rotation of the concurring partner as well as potential effects in the year before 
mandatory partner rotation (Cassell, Myers, Seidel, and Zhou 2014; Daugherty et al. 
2012; Lennox et al. 2014). Therefore, it is important to control for these other changes in 
the audit team’s environment to isolate the effect of mandatory lead partner rotation. 
Accordingly, OtherPtnrChanges is a vector of indicator variables that are set equal to 1 
for the year before mandatory lead partner rotation, the year of mandatory concurring 
partner rotation, the year before mandatory concurring partner rotation, and years of 
non-mandatory concurring partner rotation, and set equal to 0 otherwise. For parsimony, 
these control variables are not reported in the tables; see Section V for additional 
discussion. I also include year- and industry-fixed effects and cluster standard errors by 
company. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
3.2.2 Proxy for Audit Quality: Material Control Weakness Disclosures 
My second proxy for audit quality is the reporting of a material control weakness 
in the auditor’s opinion on internal control effectiveness. I estimate the following logistic 
regression model: 
𝑀𝑊𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝑋𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶ℎ𝑔_𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐶ℎ𝑔_𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽13𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14−17𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜇,         (2) 
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where MW is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm’s opinion on internal 
controls reports a material weakness in year t, and equal to 0 otherwise. Again, 
MandatoryRotation is the main variable of interest, where a positive (negative) 
coefficient on MandatoryRotation indicates a higher (lower) likelihood of reporting a 
material weakness in the year of rotation. Consistent with Rice and Weber (2012) and 
DeFond and Lennox (2015), higher quality audits should increase the likelihood that 
material weaknesses are detected and reported. Therefore, holding client risk constant 
and only allowing for the change of audit partners through mandatory rotation, a positive 
(negative) coefficient on MandatoryRotation is interpreted as higher (lower) audit 
quality in the year of rotation. 
Consistent with Rice and Weber (2012), I also control for whether the prior year 
was subsequently restated (Restated), which is likely to be associated with material 
weaknesses in the current year. I control for company size as measured by total assets 
(LogAT). To control for factors that likely affect the financial resources available to 
establish an effective control environment, I also control for reporting a loss in the 
current or previous two years (Loss) as well as external financing obtained (XFin). I 
directly control for auditor effort using audit fees (LogAF) and non-audit fees (LogNAF). 
Finally, because a new audit firm or new management can fault previous regimes for 
problems identified in the current year, I control for the first year of the auditor-client 
relationship (Chg_Aud) as well as changes in CEO or CFO (Chg_Mgmt). To account for 
other auditor-related characteristics, I also control for the audit firm’s local industry 
expertise (Expert), office size (OfficeClients), the logged tenure of the audit firm-client 
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relationship (LogTenure), and the length of the audit (ReportLag). Consistent with 
Equation (1), I also include the vector of control variables for other partner changes 
(OtherPtnrChanges), and I include year-fixed effects and cluster standard errors by 
industry.9  
3.2.3 Proxy for Audit Quality: Modified Audit Opinion 
 The audit opinion is the only direct communication between auditors and 
investors, and prior literature has considered the content of the audit report as relevant in 
determining audit quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Therefore, I use modified audit 
opinions as a proxy for auditor reporting conservatism and estimate the following 
logistic regression: 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽10𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐶ℎ𝑔_𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽18𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽20𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽21−24𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝜇,                                       (3) 
where Modify is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit report issued in period t 
diverges from the standard unqualified audit report, and equal to 0 otherwise (Francis 
                                                          
9 Industry-fixed effects are omitted from logistic regressions in Equations (2) and (3) due to loss of sample 
size from perfect prediction of the dependent variable within some industry groups. I cluster on 2-digit 
SIC code, thus providing sufficient clusters to estimate robust standard errors. Cameron et al. (2011) 
suggest that clustering at the highest aggregate level of observation is preferred and accounts for possible 
correlation of errors at a lower level. Thus clustering on industry also accounts for possible correlation of 
errors at the company level. Inferences are consistent if I include industry-fixed effects and cluster 
standard errors by company. 
21 
and Krishnan 1999). Potential differences from the standard audit report include 
qualified opinions, emphasis of matter paragraphs, going concern modifications, or 
adverse opinions. Given the potential for such additional information to be viewed as 
negative news by investors, Francis and Krishnan (1999) characterizes the issuance of a 
modified opinion as capturing auditor conservatism. Therefore, higher (lower) audit 
quality in the year of mandatory lead partner rotation will be evidenced by a positive 
(negative) coefficient on MandatoryRotation.  
 To isolate the effect of having a newly-rotated partner on the likelihood of 
issuing a modified audit opinion, I control for company size (LogAT) and complexity 
and performance (Segment, Foreign, MB, Leverage, ROA, AR_INV, Loss, Special). I also 
control for the auditor-specific characteristics (LogNAF, Chg_Aud, Expert, 
OfficeClients, LogTenure, ReportLag) included in Equations (1) and (2). Following 
Francis and Krishnan (1999) and Bradshaw et al. (2001), I control for cash flow 
(CashFlow) and stock return volatility (RetVol).10 Finally, I control for litigious 
industries (Litig) and M&A activity (Merger) because of the potential for litigation and 
mergers and acquisitions activity to generate items significant enough to merit mention 
in an auditor’s emphasis of matter paragraph. Consistent with Equation (2), I include a 
vector of control variables for other partner changes (OtherPtnrChanges), and I include 
year-fixed effects and cluster standard errors by industry.  
                                                          
10 Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Francis and Krishnan (1999) also include a measure of discretionary accruals 
as their independent variable of interest. In untabulated analysis, I include DAcc in Equation (3). The 
coefficient on DAcc is insignificant (p=0.245) and including this variable in Equation (3) results in a 10 
percent sample reduction. As such, I omit DAcc from Equation (3). 
22 
3.3 Tests of Hypotheses 
The primary independent variable of interest is MandatoryRotation, an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the company-year observation experienced mandatory lead partner 
rotation in that year, and equal to 0 otherwise. Because of competing theories, H1 is 
stated in the null, that mandatory lead partner rotation has no effect on audit quality. 
Higher audit quality in the year of mandatory lead partner rotation will be evidenced by 
a positive coefficient in Equation (1) (i.e., higher audit fees), Equation (2) (i.e., higher 
likelihood of identifying and reporting material weaknesses), and Equation (3) (i.e., 
higher likelihood of issuing a modified audit opinion). Alternatively, a negative 
coefficient on MandatoryRotation in Equations (1) – (3) will signal lower audit quality 
in the year of mandatory lead partner rotation as evidenced by lower fees, a lower 
likelihood of identifying and reporting material weaknesses, and a lower likelihood of 
issuing a modified audit opinion. 
 H2 posits that the effect of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality will 
depend on office size. To test H2, I split the sample by LargeOffice, an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the office has a number of clients equal to or greater than the sample 
median, and equal to 0 otherwise.11 I then estimate Equations (1), (2), and (3) on all 
samples. As discussed in Section II, I hypothesize that the effect of mandatory rotation 
on audit quality to be positive in large audit offices and negative in small audit offices.  
  
                                                          
11 In untabulated analysis splitting at the sample mean office size instead of the sample median, I continue 
to find that office size moderates the effect of mandatory lead partner rotation on material weaknesses and 
the issuance of modified audit opinions. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 I present all tables referenced in the manuscript in Appendix B.  Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics for my sample. Table 1, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics; 
certain variables have been omitted to maintain anonymity of the audit firm. Because 
Equation (1) is the most comprehensive of the three models used in my analyses and 
covers the full sample period from 2000-2012, descriptive statistics in Table 1, Panel A 
are based on observations with sufficient data to estimate Equation (1). For parsimony, 
variables that are included in multiple models are only presented once.  
 Although omitted from Table 1, Panel A, mean total assets (AT) and mean audit 
fees (AF) of companies in my sample are larger than the median values reported in 
Compustat and Audit Analytics. Approximately 32 percent of my sample receive an 
audit report that diverges from the standard unqualified audit report, relatively consistent 
with the 28 percent reported in Butler, Leone, and Willenborg (2004). Approximately 9 
percent report at least one material weakness, consistent with Foster, Ornstein, and 
Shastri (2007). The consistency of material weakness and modified opinion frequency 
with prior literature provides comfort that my results are likely not due to idiosyncrasies 
in the participating audit firm’s client base. 
 Table 1, Panel B, details the frequency of lead and concurring partner rotation in 
the base sample before any model-specific sample reductions. While 9.44 percent of 
observations experience mandatory lead partner rotation, only 5.80 percent experience 
24 
non-mandatory lead partner rotation.12 This is consistent with views expressed by 
partners in Daugherty et al. (2012) in which rotation was generally viewed as a negative 
event. Therefore, lead engagement partners tend to avoid client rotation until mandated 
by law, but occasionally do rotate before mandated term limits. The trend among 
concurring partners is the opposite; only 3.82 percent of observations experience 
mandatory concurring partner rotation, whereas 11.78 percent experience a non-
mandatory change in concurring partner. The infrequency with which concurring 
partners are mandatorily rotated brings into question whether this class of partners 
should be forced to rotate, or whether they rotate enough on their own to avoid 
reductions in independence. 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
4.2.1 Audit Fees 
 Table 2 presents the results of estimating Equation (1), which examines the effect 
of mandatory lead partner rotation on audit fees. Consistent with prior literature, higher 
audit fees are primarily driven by client size (LogAT). Moreover, audit fees are also 
positively associated with the number of business segments (Segment), foreign 
operations (Foreign), loss years (Loss), higher accounts receivable and inventory 
balances (AR_INV), higher leverage (Leverage), special items (Special), growth (MB), 
modified audit opinions (Modify), auditor expertise (Expert), office size (OfficeClients), 
                                                          
12 Frequency of mandatory lead partner rotation is less than the maximum value of 20 percent (i.e., every 
five years) due to non-mandatory rotation as well as client-firm relationships that do not reach partner term 
limits.  
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and longer audits (ReportLag). Alternatively, stronger financial performance (ROA) is 
associated with lower audit fees.  
 Column 1 of Table 2 compares the effect of mandatory lead partner rotation on 
audit fees to all observations without lead partner rotation. As indicated by the 
insignificant coefficient on MandatoryRotation, there appears to be no average effect of 
mandatory lead partner rotation on audit fees (p-value > 0.10). This insignificant result is 
consistent with Bamber and Bamber (2009), in which concerns were raised about 
researchers’ ability to identify an average effect of partner rotation and thus called for 
cross-sectional examination. H2 posits that the effect of mandatory lead partner rotation 
on audit quality depends on office size. Specifically, the benefits of mandatory partner 
rotation, if any, are likely found in large audit offices, whereas the costs of rotation are 
expected to be concentrated in small audit offices. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 present 
the results of Equation (1) after splitting samples at the median of the number of clients 
in an office (LargeOffice). As shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2, the coefficient on 
MandatoryRotation is positive and significant among clients audited by large audit 
offices (p-value = 0.04), and negative but insignificant in small audit offices (p-value = 
0.14).13 Thus, mandatory lead partner rotation is associated with higher fees in large 
offices, with no similar increase in small offices.14 Taken together, the results from 
                                                          
13 Untabulated analysis using seemingly unrelated estimation shows that coefficients on 
MandatoryRotation in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 are significantly different from each other (p-value = 
0.05). Inferences are also consistent when interacting MandatoryRotation with LargeOffice (interaction 
term positive and significant at p-value = 0.05, suggesting higher audit fees upon rotation in large offices 
than small offices). 
 
14 These results are consistent when regressing abnormal audit fees (Hribar et al. 2014) on 
MandatoryRotation and control variables from Equation (1). 
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Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 suggest that office size moderates the effect of mandatory 
lead partner rotation on audit quality as proxied for by audit fees. 
4.2.2 Material Weaknesses 
 Table 3 reports the results of estimating Equation (2). All models report adequate 
fit. Results indicate that prior material misstatements (Misstated), poor financial 
performance (Loss), higher audit fees (LogAF), changes to the auditor (Chg_Aud), and 
longer audits (ReportLag) are all associated with a significantly higher likelihood of 
reporting a material weakness, whereas clients of industry experts or large offices 
(Expert, OfficeClients) are less likely to report a material weakness. 
 As shown in Table 3, Column 1, mandatory lead partner rotation appears to have 
no effect on the likelihood of reporting a material weakness when compared to 
observations with no lead partner rotation (p-value > 0.10). This result is consistent with 
Table 2, and again fails to reject H2 that there is no average effect of mandatory lead 
partner rotation on audit quality. However, as shown in Columns 2 and 3, auditors in 
large offices are more likely to report a material weakness in the year of mandatory lead 
partner rotation (p-value = 0.01), whereas auditors in small offices are significantly less 
likely to report a material weakness in the year of rotation (p-value = 0.06).15 This 
finding further suggests the moderating effect of office size on the relationship between 
mandatory rotation and audit quality and provides additional evidence in support of H2.  
                                                          
15 Untabulated analysis using seemingly unrelated estimation shows that coefficients on 
MandatoryRotation in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 are significantly different from each other (p-value < 
0.01). Inferences are also consistent when interacting MandatoryRotation with LargeOffice (interaction 
term positive and significant at p-value < 0.01, suggesting higher likelihood of identifying and reporting a 
material weakness upon rotation in large offices than small offices). 
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4.2.3 Modified Audit Opinions 
 Table 4 reports the results of estimating Equation (3) to identify the effect of 
mandatory lead partner rotation on the likelihood of a modified audit opinion. Model fit 
is adequate in all columns. Coefficients on control variables indicate that client size 
(LogAT), number of business segments (Segment), foreign income (Foreign), growth 
(MB), non-audit fees (LogNAF), clients of industry experts and large offices (Expert, 
OfficeClients), longer audits (ReportLag), and being in a litigious industry (Litig) are 
associated with a significantly higher likelihood of a modified audit opinion. 
Alternatively, stronger financial performance (ROA), having assets more concentrated in 
accounts receivable and inventory (AR_INV), and having a new audit firm (Chg_Aud) 
are significantly associated with a lower likelihood of a modified opinion.  
Consistent with my first two proxies for audit quality, results in Column 1 of 
Table 4 fail to reject H1 (coefficient on MandatoryRotation insignificant at p-value > 
0.10). However, results from Columns 2 and 3 further support H2 that the effect of 
rotation on audit quality is moderated by office size. Specifically, I find that the year of 
mandatory lead partner rotation is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of the 
auditor issuing a modified opinion in large offices (p-value = 0.01), with no effect in 
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small offices (coefficient on MandatoryRotation negative and insignificant at p-value > 
0.10).16 
When considered together, the multivariate results from Tables 2, 3, and 4 are 
consistent across my three proxies for audit quality. The evidence suggests that 
mandatory lead partner rotation in the U.S. does not affect all audit offices equally. 
Specifically, clients of large offices reap the benefits of higher audit quality in the 
rotation year, consistent with the greater aggregate knowledge of large offices 
effectively offsetting the loss of the departing partner’s client knowledge, thus allowing 
for a net benefit of rotation via the incoming partner’s fresh look into client risks. 
However, small offices struggle to implement partner rotation without experiencing 
reduced audit quality, consistent with recent survey evidence (Daugherty et al. 2012). 
These findings provide timely evidence on the effect of mandatory lead partner rotation 
on audit quality, and provide firms with valuable information on areas of potential 
quality control concerns in rotation years. 17 
4.2.4 Partner Industry Expertise 
 One of the primary arguments against mandatory partner rotation is the loss of 
the outgoing partner’s client-specific knowledge. However, if the incoming partner has 
                                                          
16 Untabulated SUEST tests confirms that coefficients on MandatoryRotation in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 
4 are significantly different from each other (p-value = 0.06). Butler et al. (2004) indicate that most 
modified audit opinions relate to unqualified opinions with explanatory language, i.e., going concern 
opinions or those with emphasis of matter paragraphs. In untabulated analysis, I modify Equation (3) to 
examine the likelihood of providing only the more severe of these two options, namely, going concern 
opinions. While I continue to find a positive sign on MandatoryRotation in large offices, the coefficient is 
insignificant (p-value = 0.348). 
 
17 In untabulated analysis, I remove companies from financial and utility industries from the sample, 
resulting in a 17 percent sample reduction. Results are consistent with tabulated results.  
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expertise in the new client’s industry, this loss of client-specific knowledge may be 
tempered, thus resulting in a net benefit from rotation because of the incoming partner’s 
fresh look. As such, I expect a net positive effect of mandatory lead partner rotation 
when the lead partner has industry expertise, but a net negative effect of rotation among 
lead partners lacking this expertise. As shown in Table 5, I find that among observations 
for which the lead engagement partner has at least two clients in the industry, mandatory 
partner rotation is associated with higher audit quality as evidenced by higher audit fees 
(coefficient on MandatoryRotation in Column 1 positive and significant at p-value = 
0.01), and a higher likelihood of reporting a material weakness (coefficient on 
MandatoryRotation in Column 3 positive and significant at p-value = 0.01). In this case, 
the incoming partner has at least one other client that is in the same industry as the new 
client, thus at least partially compensating for the loss of the outgoing partner’s client-
specific knowledge while allowing for a fresh look at that client’s risks. Alternatively, 
when the client is the lead engagement partner’s only client in the industry, I find 
evidence of lower audit quality in the year of rotation, as evidenced by a lower 
likelihood of reporting a material weakness (coefficient on MandatoryRotation in 
Column 4 negative and significant at p-value = 0.06).18 Therefore, when the lead 
engagement partner has industry expertise, the benefits of bringing in a fresh look 
                                                          
18 Untabulated SUEST tests show significant differences in coefficient estimates on MandatoryRotation 
between Columns 1 and 2 (p = 0.02), and Columns 3 and 4 (p = 0.01) of Table 5. Results are also robust to 
interacting partner’s industry expertise with MandatoryRotation instead of splitting the sample for audit 
fee and material weakness tests (p < 0.01 on interaction term in both cases). 
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outweigh the loss of client-specific knowledge because that loss is, in part, moderated by 
industry-specific knowledge gained by auditing other clients.19 
  
                                                          
19 A partner’s number of clients within an industry is positively associated with the number of clients in an 
office (r=0.16, p-value < 0.01, untabulated). To ensure that the partner expertise analysis in Table 5 
captures a different moderating effect than the office size analysis in Tables 2-4, in untabulated analysis I 
re-perform Tables 2-4 while also controlling for the lead engagement partner’s industry expertise. All 
results hold. 
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5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
5.1 Comparison to the Prior Year 
 Tabulated analysis compares observations with mandatory lead partner rotation 
to those with no lead partner rotation. Another potential comparison group is the year 
before the mandatory rotation event. However, it is unclear a priori whether the year 
before mandatory rotation is the optimal comparison. Compared to the year before 
rotation, audit quality effects in the rotation year could be artificially driven by the “lame 
duck” year in which the partner may divert attention from the outgoing client to focus on 
new clients (Cassell, Myers, Seidel, and Zhou 2014; Daugherty et al. 2012). 
Alternatively, knowing that a fellow partner in the subsequent year will scrutinize audit 
conclusions from the year before rotation, partners may exercise additional effort in the 
year before rotation to maintain their reputation (Lennox et al. 2014). In untabulated 
analyses, I limit my sample to the year before and the year of mandatory lead partner 
rotation. Using this sample, I compare mandatory lead partner rotation to the year before 
and find no difference, on average, between the two years using my three proxies for 
audit quality. This result is consistent with Lennox et al. (2014) who find higher quality 
in both the year before and the year of partner rotation compared to other years.  
5.2 Material Misstatements as Proxy for Audit Quality 
 Generally accepted accounting principles require that when a material error or 
misstatement is identified relating to a prior period, those prior-period financial 
statements must be restated (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2014a, 2014b). 
Recent research suggests that audit partners and investors view a subsequent financial 
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statement restatement as one of the most readily available signals of lower audit quality 
(Christensen et al. 2015). Therefore, in untabulated analysis, I use material 
misstatements as evidenced by a subsequent restatement as a proxy for low audit quality. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Cao et al. 2012), I control for the company’s size, 
complexity (M&A and financing activities, business segments, foreign income, leverage, 
AR and inventory levels, special and extraordinary items), growth, financial 
performance, change in management, and auditor-related characteristics (audit firm 
tenure, audit opinion type, office size and expertise, and report lag). 
Using a sample from 2000-2010 to allow for adequate time for restatements to be 
announced relating to my sample period, I find weak evidence that the year of 
mandatory lead partner rotation is associated with a lower likelihood of material 
misstatement (coefficient on MandatoryRotation negative, two-tailed p-value = 0.12). 
This result is consistent with the justification put forth by regulators that a “fresh look” 
improves audit partners’ ability to recognize client risks. Additionally, I find that office 
size moderates the relationship between the year before mandatory rotation and audit 
quality, with a lower likelihood of material misstatement in large offices (coefficient 
negative, p-value = 0.07), and a higher likelihood of material misstatements in small 
offices (coefficient positive, p-value = 0.05). These cross-sectional results are consistent 
with Lennox et al. (2014), who find higher quality in the year before and the year of 
partner rotation, likely because of partners’ desire to protect their reputation.  
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5.3 Concurring Partner Rotation and Audit Quality 
The majority of studies examining the effects of partner rotation (including this 
one) focus on lead partner rotation despite the fact that concurring partners are also 
required to rotate clients. While this focus is consistent with the important and visible 
role that the lead engagement partner plays, PCAOB standards also require that the audit 
be reviewed and guided by a concurring engagement partner in order to increase the 
overall quality of the audit (PCAOB 2009). As such, the concurring partner’s rotation 
may also affect audit quality. Because the concurring partner is not involved in the day-
to-day operations of the audit, the concurring partner may not be as likely to fall prey to 
independence concerns as the lead partner. Therefore, the potential benefits of obtaining 
a “fresh look” are likely smaller than the costs of losing the client-specific knowledge of 
the concurring partner upon rotation. On the other hand, precisely because the 
concurring partner is not involved in the day-to-day operations of the audit, such client-
specific knowledge loss incurred upon rotation may be minimal. Extant literature 
specifically examining the engagement review partner is scant and results are mixed 
(Chi and Chin 2011; Gold, Molls, Pott, and Watrin 2012).  
After constructing samples for concurring partner analyses using a method 
similar to the lead partner sample construction, I estimate Equations (1), (2), and (3) to 
investigate the effect of mandatory concurring partner rotation on audit quality.20 
Because concurring partners were not subject to tenure and rotation requirements until 
                                                          
20 Concurring partner rotation analysis includes control variables to control for mandatory and voluntary 
lead partner rotation, just as lead partner analysis included control variables for mandatory and voluntary 
concurring partner rotation. 
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Sarbanes-Oxley’s new rotation rules were implemented, I limit the sample for 
concurring partner rotation analysis to years 2004-2012. In untabulated analysis, I find 
no effect for mandatory concurring partner rotation on the likelihood of the level of 
logged audit fees, the likelihood of reporting a material weakness, or the likelihood of a 
modified audit opinion (p-value on MandatoryRotation > 0.10 in all cases). However, 
after splitting the sample by LargeOffice, I find that small audit offices charge lower fees 
than large offices in the year of mandatory concurring partner rotation (p-value = 0.06), 
and that large audit offices are more likely than small offices to identify material 
weaknesses in the rotation year (p-value = 0.04).21 This result is consistent with results 
from lead partner rotation suggesting that mandatory concurring partner rotation’s effect 
on audit quality is moderated by office size.  
5.4 Lead Partner Serving as Concurring Partner for another Client 
 Regulations permit a lead engagement partner to simultaneously serve as a 
different client’s concurring partner. Because concurring partners are audit partners 
themselves, these individuals frequently seek to have their own lead clients in addition to 
their review responsibilities. However, serving in both roles may reduce the lead 
engagement partner’s attention during the mandatory rotation year, thus reducing the 
effect of rotation on audit quality. In untabulated analysis, controlling for instances in 
which lead partners serve double roles, I continue to find higher audit quality in the year 
                                                          
21 If concurring partners did not come from the same office as the engagement team, then splitting the 
sample on engagement team’s office size would not be appropriate when examining concurring partner 
rotation. However, per discussion with a national office partner from the participating firm, the majority of 
concurring review partners come from the same office as the engagement leader, thus justifying this 
analysis. 
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of mandatory lead partner rotation overall, but that the effect is moderated by office size 
and lead partner industry expertise. 
5.5 Different Rotation Regimes 
Prior to 2004, lead partners were allowed to serve clients up to seven consecutive 
years.22 Because my sample contains observations from 2000-2012, tabulated results 
also include observations subject to the previous rotation requirements. To ensure that 
my results are not unduly influenced by these earlier observations, I re-run Equations (1) 
and (3) including only observations from 2004 through 2012; Equation (2) is already 
limited to years 2004-2012 due to the availability of material weakness disclosures. 
Using this revised sample, I continue to find an overall benefit of mandatory lead partner 
rotation and that this effect is moderated by office size and partner industry expertise. 
Based on these results, my findings are not driven by observations subject to the 
previous rotation requirements.  
5.6 Requiring a Mandatory Rotation Event for Sample Inclusion 
 Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Chi et al. 2009), I do not require all 
companies in my sample to have experienced a mandatory partner rotation to be 
included in my sample. Many reasons exist as to why a company might not have such an 
event in my sample period including, but not limited to, the tenure of the auditor-client 
relationship failing to reach five years, the lead engagement partner rotating before 
reaching the tenure limit, etc. To ensure that my results are not driven by including 
                                                          
22 New requirements (e.g., 5-year on, 5-year off) became effective for all fiscal years starting on or after 
May 6, 2003 (SEC 2003). Therefore, the new rotation requirements generally began affecting companies 
starting with their fiscal year 2004 audits, at the earliest. 
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companies that never have a lead partner rotate due to term limits, in untabulated 
analysis I further refine my sample by requiring that a company experience mandatory 
lead partner rotation at least once. Even under this much stricter sample requirement, I 
continue to find that the effect of mandatory lead partner rotation on audit quality is 
moderated by office size and lead partner industry expertise. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 Current guidelines mandate that lead and concurring audit partners rotate clients 
every five years, followed by a five-year cooling-off period. Because of data availability, 
empirical evidence on mandatory partner rotation effects on audit quality has been 
limited primarily to international studies, which may or may not apply to the U.S. setting 
because of differences in the financial reporting environment. In addition, partners in the 
U.S. have been subject to some form of mandatory rotation since the 1970s, but the 
effect of U.S. partner rotation on audit quality is still unclear. I use proprietary data from 
a large audit firm to respond to Bamber and Bamber’s (2009) call for additional research 
into the specific costs and benefits of mandatory partner rotation. 
 My results indicate that the effect of mandatory lead partner rotation on audit 
quality is context-specific. Specifically, I find that compared to all non-rotation years, 
years of mandatory lead partner rotation in large offices have higher audit fees, a higher 
likelihood of identifying and reporting a material weakness, and a higher likelihood of 
an auditor issuing a modified audit opinion, all of which suggest higher audit quality in 
the rotation year. This result is consistent with the “fresh look” hypothesis put forth by 
regulators (SEC 2003). Clients of small offices, however, do not experience such 
benefits. My results support the notion that large offices are better able to deal with 
mandatory rotation than small offices, and small office audit quality may suffer as a 
result. I also find that the effect of mandatory lead partner rotation on audit quality 
depends on the lead engagement partner’s industry expertise, with increased audit 
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quality in the rotation year when the lead engagement partner has experience in the new 
client’s industry, and decreased audit quality when the partner lacks such experience. 
 I make several contributions to the audit literature in general and the rotation 
literature specifically. First, I provide the first large sample evidence on mandatory 
partner rotation in the United States, including both lead and concurring partners. 
Second, and in direct response to Bamber and Bamber’s (2009) call for more nuanced 
evidence of the effect of rotation, I provide evidence that mandatory rotation is not 
equally effective in every setting. Understanding conditions in which rotation is 
beneficial versus when it is costly can inform future regulation and alert audit firms to 
pay attention to partner rotation effects in smaller offices and when the incoming partner 
lacks industry experience. Finally, these results suggest that disclosure of partner-
specific information is important and can provide useful insights into the determinants of 
audit quality. 
My study is subject to several limitations. First, while the firm used in this study 
is a large audit firm subject to annual PCAOB inspections, it is only one firm and results 
could differ for other audit firms. However, because of the large size of the audit firm, it 
is reasonable to believe my findings apply to other firms, Second, because having 
rotation requirements vary by audit office size could have unintended consequences (i.e., 
firms shifting clients and lead partners to smaller audit offices, firms splitting up larger 
offices, etc.), gaining access to additional data would be especially important in 
determining future policy implications. Third, my results relating to partner’s industry 
expertise only capture expertise related to clients that file 10-Ks; due to data limitations, 
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I am unable to capture partner’s industry experience provided by auditing private clients. 
Finally, the study examines mandatory rotation over 12 years, during which individual 
partners would have experienced mandatory rotation only a few times. As time spent 
under the current rotation requirements increases, future research can examine how firms 
adapt to the costs associated with mandatory partner rotation.  
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition 
AF= Sum of audit fees (Audit Analytics data code ‘audit_fees’) and 
audit-related fees (Audit Analytics data code ‘audit_related_fees’) 
as reported in the Audit Analytics fee database (Charles et al. 2010). 
The raw dollar value is then scaled by 1,000. 
AR_INV= Accounts receivable (Compustat data code ‘rect’) plus inventory 
(Compustat data code ‘invt’), scaled by total assets (Compustat data 
code ‘at’). I winsorize AR_INV at the top and bottom 1 percent. 
AT= Total assets (Compustat data code ‘at’). 
CashFlow= Net cash flow from operating activities (Compustat data code 
‘oancf’) divided by average total assets (i.e., beginning of year + 
end of year divided by two). 
Chg_Aud= Indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm (Audit Analytics data 
code ‘auditor_fkey’) in the current year is different than the audit 
firm in the prior year. 
Chg_Mgmt= Following Rice and Weber (2012), an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the company changed CEO or CFO within the current or prior two 
years according to Audit Analytics, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
DAcc= Discretionary accruals as calculated by a cross-sectional Modified 
Jones model. Values are estimated for each two-digit SIC/year 
combination with a minimum of 10 observations (Dechow et al. 
1995), scaled by total assets (Compustat data code ‘at’). I winsorize 
DAcc at the top and bottom 1 percent. 
Expert= Equal to 1 if an auditor’s fee-based market share within an MSA-
Industry level is greater than or equal to 50 percent in a given year. 
Observations with only one client in an MSA-industry-year are reset 
to 0. Market share calculations are made using all necessary data 
from Audit Analytics and before any sample reductions. A 50 
percent MSA-industry threshold is consistent with city expertise as 
captured in Reichelt and Wang (2010). 
Foreign= Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company reported any foreign 
taxes paid (Compustat data code ‘txfo’; missing values set to zero), 
and equal to 0 otherwise. 
LargeOffice= Indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm office serviced a 
number of clients in a given year greater than or equal to the sample 
median, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Leverage= Long-term debt (Compustat data code ‘dltt’) plus long-term debt in 
current liabilities (Compustat data code ‘dlc’), scaled by total assets 
(Compustat data code ‘at’). I winsorize Leverage at the top and 
bottom 1 percent. 
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Variable Definition 
Litig= Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is in a litigious industry 
following Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994), and equal to 0 
otherwise. 
LogAF= Natural log of AF. 
LogAT= Natural log of AT. 
LogNAF= Natural log of NAF. 
LogTenure= Natural log of the audit firm-client relationship. 
Loss= Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company reported negative 
income before extraordinary items (Compustat data code ‘ib’) in the 
current year or in either of the prior two years, and equal to 0 
otherwise. 
MandatoryRotation= Indicator variable equal to 1 in the year of mandatory lead partner 
rotation (e.g., the year when the new lead engagement partner 
arrives), and 0 otherwise. 
MB= The market value of the company’s equity, calculated by 
multiplying the end-of-year share price (Compustat data code 
‘prcc_f’) by end-of-year shares outstanding (Compustat data code 
‘csho’), all scaled by common equity (Compustat data code ‘ceq’). I 
winsorize MB at the top and bottom 1 percent. 
Misstated= Using data from Audit Analytics, an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
any period of company i’s financial statements from year t are 
subsequently restated, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Merger= Following Cao et al. (2012), an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
company was involved in M&A activity in the current year 
(Compustat data code ‘sale_fn’ codes AA, AB, AR, AS, FA, FB, 
FC, FD, FE, or FF), and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Modify= Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company reported an audit 
opinion code (‘auop’) different than 1, and equal to 0 otherwise 
(Francis and Krishnan 1999). 
MW= Indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor reported at least one 
material weakness in the current year (Audit Analytics code 
‘count_weak’), and equal to 0 otherwise. 
NAF= The sum of IT fees (Audit Analytic data code ‘it_fees’), tax fees 
(Audit Analytic data code ‘tax_fees’), benefits fees(Audit Analytics 
data code ‘benefits_fees’), and other fees (Audit Analytics data code 
‘other_fees’) as reported in the Audit Analytics fee database. 
OfficeClients= The number of clients at the MSA-audit firm level in a given year. 
OtherPtnrChanges= A vector of indicator variables that are set equal to 1 for the year 
before mandatory lead partner rotation, the year of mandatory 
concurring partner rotation, the year before mandatory concurring 
partner rotation, years of non-mandatory concurring partner 
rotation, and set equal to 0 otherwise. 
ReportLag= Number of days between the company’s fiscal year end (Compustat 
data code ‘datadate’) and the signing of the audit opinion (Audit 
Analytics data code ‘sig_date_of_op_s’). 
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Variable Definition 
RetVol= The average daily stock return volatility during the current and prior 
year (Cao et al. 2012). 
ROA= Return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat data code ‘ib’) divided by lagged total assets 
(Compustat data code ‘at’). I winsorize ROA at the top and bottom 1 
percent. 
Segment= The number of business segments (‘busseg’) as reported in the 
Compustat segment database. 
Special= Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company reported any special 
items (‘spi’), and equal to 0 otherwise. 
XFin= Following Rice and Weber (2012), equal to the sum of cash 
received from the sale of stock and issuance of long-term debt, 
minus cash used in repurchase of stock, payment of dividends, and 
reduction of debt (Compustat data codes sstk, dltis, prstkc, dv, dltr, 
dlcch; missing values reset to zero) scaled by average total assets 
(Compustat at). I winsorize XFin at the top and bottom 1 percent. 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLES 
Table 1 
Panel A: Descriptive Statisticsa 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Audit Fee Model      
Dacct-1 0.15 0.03 2.07 -0.11 0.30 
Segment 1.98 1.00 1.43 1.00 3.00 
Foreign 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
ROA -0.04 0.02 0.29 -0.07 0.09 
Loss 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
AR_INV 0.30 0.27 0.21 0.13 0.44 
Leverage 0.19 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.30 
Special 0.57 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
MB 2.60 1.66 4.04 0.93 3.01 
Modify 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
ReportLag 70.77 70.00 33.50 59.00 77.00 
      
Material Weakness Model     
MW 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 
Misstatedt-1 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 
XFin 0.05 0.00 0.25 -0.05 0.06 
Chg_Mgmt 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
      
Modified Audit Opinion Model     
CashFlow 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.00 0.14 
Merger 0.16 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 
Litig 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
RetVol 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 
      
aDescriptive statistics based on the sample of company-year observations from 2000-2012 
used to estimate Equation (1). This sample was chosen because it is the least restrictive. 
Certain variables (AF, AT, NAF, LogTenure, Expert50, OfficeClients and Chg_Aud) are 
omitted from presentation to maintain anonymity of the participating audit firm. Variables 
from the audit fee model that are also included in other models (e.g., control weakness model) 
are not presented twice. Variables are described in the Appendix. Because of the proprietary 
nature of the data, the exact number of observations are not presented but the final dataset 
numbers in the thousands of observations.  
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Table 1 Continued 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on Frequency of Rotationa 
Type of Rotation Frequency 
Mandatory Lead Partner 9.44% 
Non-Mandatory Lead Partner 5.80% 
Mandatory Concurring Partner 3.82% 
Non-Mandatory Concurring Partner 11.78% 
  
aStatistics on frequency of partner rotation are from the base 
sample of company-year observations from 2000-2012 before 
any additional sample restrictions. 
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Table 2 
Effect of Mandatory Lead Partner Rotation on Audit Feesa 
  
Full Sample 
(1) 
Large Offices 
(2) 
Small Offices 
(3) 
MandatoryRotation 0.019 0.062** -0.048 
  (0.524) (0.041) (0.143) 
LogAT 0.422*** 0.419*** 0.423*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAcct-1 0.004 0.014* -0.004 
 (0.519) (0.093) (0.575) 
Segment 0.045** 0.066*** -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.962) 
Foreign 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.241*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.182** -0.169 -0.142 
 (0.035) (0.193) (0.116) 
Loss 0.065 0.115** 0.018 
 (0.103) (0.038) (0.724) 
AR_INV 0.171 0.453** -0.072 
 (0.136) (0.013) (0.586) 
Leverage 0.055 0.179* -0.056 
 (0.486) (0.093) (0.581) 
Special 0.157*** 0.163*** 0.121*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
MB 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.225) 
Modify 0.214*** 0.229*** 0.193*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogNAF 0.008 0.002 0.011 
 (0.442) (0.887) (0.337) 
Chg_Aud -0.054 -0.016 -0.080 
 (0.225) (0.819) (0.148) 
Expert 0.135** 0.144* 0.100 
 (0.016) (0.065) (0.195) 
OfficeClients 0.001 0.014** 0.016 
 (0.758) (0.011) (0.101) 
LogTenure -0.034 0.021 -0.071 
 (0.420) (0.724) (0.182) 
ReportLag 0.002** 0.001 0.003*** 
 (0.033) (0.258) (0.001) 
Intercept 2.025*** 1.440*** 2.593*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Controls for other partner changes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.712 0.718 0.752 
    aDependent variable equal to logged audit fees. Large (small) offices are those with greater than or equal to 
(less than) the median number of clients. Standard errors clustered by company. Two-tailed p-values in 
parentheses for all coefficients except for MandatoryRotation in Columns (2) and (3), in which I predict a 
positive (negative) association, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations from 2000-2012.  
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Table 3 
Effect of Mandatory Lead Partner Rotation on Material Weaknessesa 
 
Full Sample 
(1) 
Large Offices 
(2) 
Small Offices 
(3) 
MandatoryRotation 0.153 0.932** -0.897* 
  (0.675) (0.014) (0.060) 
Misstatedt-1 0.975*** 0.902** 1.052*** 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.002) 
LogAT -0.206 -0.069 -0.169 
 (0.156) (0.710) (0.185) 
Loss 0.559** 0.917** 0.147 
 (0.037) (0.023) (0.652) 
XFin 0.577 0.975 0.809 
 (0.212) (0.266) (0.206) 
LogAF 1.140*** 1.448*** 0.961*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
LogNAF 0.022 0.096 0.001 
 (0.704) (0.358) (0.994) 
Chg_Aud 0.540 0.984* 0.163 
 (0.338) (0.090) (0.802) 
Chg_Mgmt 0.304 0.050 0.264 
 (0.226) (0.903) (0.501) 
Expert -0.694 0.188 -1.542** 
 (0.152) (0.759) (0.031) 
OfficeClients -0.039*** -0.102*** -0.022 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.644) 
LogTenure -0.028 0.168 -0.388 
 (0.932) (0.667) (0.380) 
ReportLag 0.030 0.015 0.099*** 
 (0.131) (0.359) (0.000) 
Intercept -11.496*** -13.514*** -14.304*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Controls for other partner changes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.276 0.345 0.338 
ROC Curve 0.873 0.903 0.879 
Goodness-of-Fit Test 0.080 0.995 0.481 
aDependent variable equal to 1 if the auditor reported a material weakness in the current year, 0 
otherwise. Large (small) offices are those with greater than or equal to (less than) the median 
number of clients. Standard errors clustered by 2-digit SIC code. Two-tailed p-values in parentheses 
for all coefficients except for MandatoryRotation in Columns (2) and (3), in which I predict a 
positive (negative) association, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations from 2004-2012.  
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Table 4 
Effect of Mandatory Lead Partner Rotation on Modified Audit Opinionsa 
  
Full Sample 
(1) 
Large Offices 
(2) 
Small Offices 
(3) 
MandatoryRotation 0.196 0.712** -0.216 
  (0.536) (0.018) (0.323) 
LogAT 0.134** 0.140 0.117 
 (0.025) (0.102) (0.113) 
Segment 0.050 0.096* 0.005 
 (0.355) (0.096) (0.956) 
Foreign 0.292* 0.377** 0.317* 
 (0.053) (0.031) (0.091) 
MB 0.021 0.067** -0.001 
 (0.195) (0.015) (0.980) 
Leverage 0.146 -0.540 0.603 
 (0.681) (0.393) (0.140) 
ROA -0.680* -0.754 -0.719 
 (0.096) (0.132) (0.227) 
AR_INV -1.230*** -0.828** -1.572** 
 (0.007) (0.044) (0.017) 
Loss -0.031 -0.193 0.222 
 (0.846) (0.463) (0.277) 
Special 0.060 0.110 -0.105 
 (0.592) (0.553) (0.583) 
LogNAF 0.049 0.106** 0.026 
 (0.216) (0.049) (0.637) 
Chg_Aud -0.586** -0.371 -0.980** 
 (0.016) (0.252) (0.027) 
Expert 0.693*** 1.216*** 0.364* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.077) 
OfficeClients 0.004 0.023 0.099** 
 (0.693) (0.167) (0.017) 
LogTenure -0.082 -0.260 0.052 
 (0.630) (0.232) (0.820) 
ReportLag 0.007** 0.005* 0.013*** 
 (0.039) (0.068) (0.005) 
CashFlow -0.303 -0.479 -0.216 
 (0.538) (0.540) (0.736) 
Merger -0.215 -0.100 -0.249 
 (0.156) (0.732) (0.262) 
Litig 0.286** 0.464* 0.221 
 (0.048) (0.066) (0.523) 
RetVol 10.065** 7.346 7.637 
 (0.029) (0.433) (0.141) 
Intercept -3.518*** -4.229*** -4.032*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Controls for other partner changes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.242 0.294 0.240 
ROC Curve 0.822 0.851 0.822 
Goodness-of-Fit Test 0.798 0.371 0.882 
aDependent variable equal to 1 if the audit report was anything other than the standard unqualified audit opinion, 0 otherwise. 
Large (small) offices are those with greater than or equal to (less than) the median number of clients. Standard errors clustered 
by 2-digit SIC code. Two-tailed p-values in parentheses for all coefficients except for MandatoryRotation in Columns (2) and 
(3), in which I predict a negative (positive) association, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations from 2000-2012.  
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Table 5 
Effect of Mandatory Lead Partner Rotation on Audit Quality, by Lead Partner’s Industry Expertisea 
 Audit Fees Material Weaknesses Modified Audit Opinion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Industry 
Expertise  
No Industry 
Expertise  
Industry 
Expertise  
No Industry 
Expertise  
Industry 
Expertise  
No Industry 
Expertise  
MandatoryRotation 0.130** -0.044 1.289** -0.858* -0.160 0.504 
  (0.011) (0.160) (0.019) (0.063) (0.640) (0.928) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2/R2 0.670 0.753 0.381 0.274 0.268 0.272 
ROC Curve N/A N/A 0.911 0.860 0.839 0.838 
Goodness-of-Fit 
Test N/A N/A 0.506 0.466 0.686 0.418 
       
aDependent variables are LogAF (Columns 1 and 2), MW (Columns 3 and 4), and Modify (Columns 5 and 6). Industry 
Expertise (No Industry Expertise) are those companies audited by a lead partner with two or more (one) client in the 
company’s industry. Control variables are from Equations (1), (2), and (3) as detailed in the text, and standard errors are 
clustered consistent with Tables 2-4. Sample contains all observations of mandatory lead partner rotation and all 
observations with no lead partner rotation. One-tailed p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
